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| The Spread Of the Naxalite Movement |
Introduction
Naxilite or Naxalvadis (name from the village of Naxalbari in the Indian State of West Bengal where the movement originated), are a group of far-left radical communists, supportive of Maoist political sentiment and ideology. Their origin can be traced to the split in 1967 of the Communist Party of India (Marxist), leading to formation of Communist Party of India (Marxist – Leninist). Initially the movement had its centre in West Bengal. In recent years, they have spread into less developed areas of rural central and Eastern India, such as Chhattisgarh and Andhra Pradesh through the activities of underground groups like Communist Party of India (Maoist). They lead the Naxalite-Maoist insurgency. As of 2009, Naxalites are active across approximately 220 districts in twenty state of India [2] accounting for about 40 percent of India’s geographical area, They are especially concentrated in an area known as the “Red corridor”, where they control 92,000 square kilometers. According to India’s intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing, 20,000 armed cadre Naxalites were operating apart from 50,000 regular cadres working in their various mass organizations and millions of sympathizers, and their growing influence prompted India Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to declare them as the most serious internal threat to India’s National Security. The Naxalites are opposed by virtually all mainstream Indian political group. In February, 2009, Central Government announced its plans for simultaneous, co-ordinated counter-operations in all Left-wing extremism-hit states- Chhattisgarh, Orissa, Andra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Jharkhand, Bihar, Utter Pradesh and West Bengal to plug all possible escape routes of Naxalites. Violence in Bengal.
The Naxal movement was immensely popular with not only the radical sections of the student movement in Calcutta, but the whole student body of Bengal undeniably were sympathetic about them since the mainstream Communist ideology had proved itself to be hypocritical and farcical in practice. The state machinery of India systematically annihilated this student support baseline from the whole movement as international human right watchdog bodies picked up frantic call of disappearances of students and intellectuals. Between 1969 and 1979 an estimated 5000 students and intellectuals disappeared or were killed under mysterious conditions. Charu Majumdar progressively changed the tactics of CPI(ML), and declared that revolutionary warfare was to take place not only in the rural areas but everywhere and spontaneously.
Throughout Calcutta, school were shut down. The student of Jadavpur University used the machine shop facilities to make pipe guns to attack the police, resulting in the deaths of several dozen policemen and an unconfirmed number of civilians. Their headquarters become Presidency College, Kolkata. The movement soon found ardent supporters amongst most of the educated class, and Delhi’s prestigious St. Stephen’s College, alma mater of many contemporary Indian leaders and thinkers, became a hotbed of Naxalite activities.
How many Naxalite groups are there?
The Communist Party of India (Marxist – Leninist) is the political outfit that propagates the Naxalite ideology. There are front organizations and special outfits for specific groups such as the Indian People’s Front, People’s War, Maoist Communist Centre, People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army etc.,
Where do the Naxalites operate?
The Naxalites Operate mostly in the rural and Adivasi areas. These areas are the least developed areas of India. Their operation is most prominent in (from North to South) Jharkhand, Chattisgarh, West Bengal, Madhya Pradesh, Eastern Maharastra, the Telengana (North – Western) region of Andhra Pradesh, and Western Orissa.
Who do the Naxalites Represent ?
The Naxalites claim to represent the most oppressed people in India those who are often left untouched by India’s development and by passed by the electoral process. Invariably, they are the Adivasis, Dalits, and the poorest of the poor, who work as landless labourers, often below India’s mandated minimum wage rate. The criticism against the Naxalites is that despite their ideology – to have a classless and equal society, the Naxalites have over the year become just another terrorist outfit, extorting money from middle – level land owners, and worse, even extorting and dominating the lives of the Adivasis and villagers, who they claim to represent in the name of providing justice.
Who do the Naxalites Target?
Ideologically, the Naxalites claim they are against India as she exists currently. They believe that Indians are still to acquire freedom from hunger and deprivation and that the rich classes--------- landlords, industrialists etc…. control the means of production. Their final aim is to overthrow the present system, hence they target politicians, policemen, forest contractors, etc.
Anti – Government Stand?
The Naxalites ideology finds strength from the very concerns of the Government is trying to grapple with exploitation, low wages, unemployment and underdeveloped from sector. In the opinion of the Naxalites, the UPA Government’s SEZ policy is aimed at creating “Neo-colonial enclaves” Members of the Naxalite Movement have mobilized against proposed SEZs in Nandigram, Singur, Kalinga Nagar, Lohandiguda and Polavaram.
Mode of Operation and International Links
The Naxalites have armed platoons that seize weapons from isolated police stations. As the weaponry increased, safe houses in Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Andhra Pradesh sprung up to store AK-47s, SLRs, INSAS, 03 03s, 12 bore riffles and hand grenades landmines, improvised devices and rocket launchers were assembled in cities.
Maoist from the subcontinent chipped in through the Co-ordination committee of Maoist Parties and Organisations of south Asia (CCOMPOSA), Nepal Maoist were an important link till they joined the political mainstream. Their arms training are intense and fashioned after modules of the Liberation Tiger of Tanul Eelam (LTTE), says an intelligence officer in Raipur and Dantewada. The LTTE connection is Suspected because of the liberal use of landmines and pressure bombs. But unlike the Tigers or Islamic extremists, Indian Naxalites are yet to use suicide squads for their offensives.
Recent Naxal Violence
1) Shilda (West Midnapore)
On February, 2010 Naxals attacked a police camp where 24 Jamans of the Eastern Frontier Rifles (EFR) lost their lines. “It was not expected that such an attack would take place in a built –up area like Shilda”, Bengal Police Chief Bhupinder Singh said after an inspection of the burnt down camp of the Eastern Frontier Rifles. Officials in the Union Home Ministry identified few errors that helped the Naxals launch the attack. Lack of Preparedness despite P.Chidambaram holding a Multi-State meeting in Bengal the previous week, only two sentries were on duly, Jawans not carrying guns and letting out a toilet inside the camp to be used by outsiders were some of the major flames which went a long way in helping the Naxals carry out the attack. The Chief Minister of West Bengal, Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee said there was a lack of alertness” by police when the Maoists attacked the Eastern Frontier Rifles Camp and that an inquiry would be conducted.
2) Maoist Tentacles in Telangana.
The Andhra Pradesh Government claimed that the Telengana Movement was not “Student – driven” and had been infiltrated by “hardened “ Naxalites. The claim states that there has been large – scale Naxalite infiltration into the Telengana Movement. Harish N. Salve, counsel for the state in a Supreme Court Case, said that, “We have videographed the entire happenings on the Osmania Campus and the agitations does not appear to be student driven”,.
3) Bihar
Over a hundred Maoist guerrillas swooped down a remote Bihar village, blew up huts with dynamites and massacred nearly a dozen, including children, in an attack the rebels said was in revenge for the eight comrades. This incident look place on the midnight of 17th February 2010. The village resident said security forces were aware that their village was a target of the Maoists but did not take adequate measures.
4) Dalbhumgarh, Jharkhand
Four Maoist, hiding AK-47s abducted the BDO in the presence of over 200 people, including, some policemen, Prashant Kumar Layek (aged 34), the BDO of Dalbhum under Ghatshila sub-division of East Singhbhum District, had just about wrapped up a lok Adalat that was being held inside his office compound on the 13th of February, 2010 when four Maoist who were waiting outside his office struck they assaulted him with the butt of their rifles and forced him on one of the bikes and sped away. A Massive combing operation was launched to rescue the abducted BDO. The abducted BDO was handed over to two journalists after a six-day ordeal. Layek was handed over 150 Kms from Jamshedpur. The Maoists put up some demands to the Chief Minister of Jharkhand to release the 14 undertrials of the Maoist group.This incident shows home the Naxals can leave the government officials helpless and forcefully leading to the acceptance of their demands.
Violence has peaked in India from Maoist or Naxalite separatist violence being more dangerous to India’s national, as declared by Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.
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| Need to Rethink The Government Strategy |
From the Minister of Home Affairs it has been stated that:
• 1996: 156 deaths
• 1997: 428 deaths
• 1998: 270 deaths
• 1999: 363 deaths
• 2000: 50 deaths
• 2001:100+deaths
• 2002:140 deaths
• 2003:451 deaths
• 2004:500+deaths
• 2005:700+deaths
• 2006:750 deaths
• 2007: 650 deaths
• 2008: 794 deaths
• 2009:1134 deaths
5) POLICY TO DEAL WITH THE NAXALITE MENACE
The Government has a clearly defined policy to combat the challenge posed by the Naxalite menace. This policy comprises the following components:-
(i) The Government will deal sternly with the naxlites indulging in violence.
(ii) Keeping in view that naxalism is not merely a law & order problem, the policy of the Govt. is to address this menace simultaneously on political security, development and public perception management fronts in a holistic manner.
(iii) Naxalism being an inter-state problem, the states will adopt a collective approach and pursue a coordinated response to counter it.
(iv) The states will need to further improve police response and pursue effective and sustained police action against naxalites and their infrastructure individually and jointly.
(v) There will be no peace dialogue by the affected states with the naxal groups unless the latter agree to give up violence and arms.
(vi) Political parties must strengthen their cadre base in naxal affected areas so that the potential youth there can be weaned away from the path of naxal ideology.
(vii) The states from where naxal activity/ influence and not naxal violence, is reported should have a different approach with special focus on accelerated socio-economic development of the minimize over ground support for the naxalite ideology and activity.
(viii) Efforts will continue to be made to promote local resistance groups against naxalites but in a manner that the villagers are provided adequate security cover and the area is effectively dominated by the security forces.
(ix) Mass media should also be extensively used to highlight the futility of naxal violence and loss of life and property caused by it and developmental schemes of the Government in the affected areas so as to restore people’s faith and confidence in the Government machinery.
(x) The states should announce a suitable transfer policy for the naxal affected districts. Willing, committed and competent officers will need to be given greater delegation and flexibility to deliver better and step up Government presence in these areas.
(xi) The Government of Andhra Pradesh has an effective surrender and rehabilitation policy for naxalites and has produced good results over the years. The other states should adopt a similar policy.
(xii) The State Government will need to accord a higher priority in their annual plants to ensure faster socio-economic development of the naxal affected areas. The focus areas should be to distribute land to the landless poor as part of the speedy implementation of the land reforms, ensure development of physical infrastructure like roads, communication, power etc. and provide employment opportunities to the youth in these areas.
(xiii) Another related issue is that development activities are not undertaken in some of the maxalite affected areas mainly due to extortion, threat or fear from the naxalite cadres. In these areas, even contractors are not coming forward to take up developmental work. Adequate security and other measures would need to be taken to facilitate uninterrupted developmental activities in the naxal affected areas.
(xiv) The Central Government will continue to supplement the efforts and resources of the affected states on both security and developments fronts and bring greater co-ordination between the states to successfully tackle the problem.
COUNTER MEASURES
i. While the overall counter action by the effected states in terms of naxalites killed, arrested, surrendered and arms recovered from them has shown much better results in 2005, there is an urgent need to further improve and strengthen police response particularly by the states of Bihar, Jharkhand, Orissa, Maharashtra by improving actionable intelligence collection and sharing mechanisms and strengthening their police forces on the pattern of Greyhounds in Andhra Pradesh. Even as the states of Andhra Pradesh and Chhattisgarh to some extent, need to sustain their present momentum of effective counter action against the naxalites and their infrastructure.
ii. The Government has taken the following measures to control the naxal problem.
MODERNIZATION OF STATE POLICE
i. Funds are given to the States under the Police Modernization Scheme to modernize their police forces in terms of modern weaponry, latest communication equipment, mobility and other infrastructure. The maxal affected States have also been asked to identify vulnerable police stations and outposts in the naxal areas and take up their notification under the Scheme. However, some of the States need to improve the level of utilization of funds under the Scheme.
ii. Revision of Security Related Expenditure (SRE) Scheme in February, 2005
iii. The level of reimbursement under the Scheme has been raised from 50% to 100% and new items like insurance scheme for police personnel, community policing, and rehabilitation of surrendered naxalites, expenditure incurred on publicity to counter propaganda of naxalites, and other security related items not covered under the Police Modernization Scheme etc. have been covered. The Scheme also allows release of funds to the naxal affected States as advance. It is hoped that the revised scheme will enable higher level of utilization of funds under this Scheme.
SUPPLY OF MINE PROTECTION VEHICLES:
Keeping in view the increased casualties of police due to IED/land mine blasts, the naxal affected States have been provided Mine Protected Vehicles (MPVs) under the Police Modernization Scheme. Their supply has been streamlined by taking up the matter with the Chairman, Ordinance Factory Board.
LONG-TERM DEPLOYMENT OF CENTRAL PARA MILITARY FORCES:
In order to supplement the efforts of the States in providing an effective response to the naxal violence, Central Para Military Forces have been deployed on a long-term basis as requested by the affected States. The Central Government has also exempted the states from the payment of cost pf deployment of these forces for a period of three years from 1-7-2004 involving an amount of nearly Rs. 1,100 crores.
INDIA RESERVE BATTALIONS
The naxal affected States have been sanctioned India Reserve (IR) battalions mainly to strengthen security apparatus at their level as also to enable the States the States to provide gainful employment to the youth, particularly in the naxal areas. Recently, additional IR battalions have also been approved for the naxal affected States. The Central Government will now provide Rs. 20.75 Crores per IR battalion as against the earlier amount of Rs. 13 Crores per battalion. The States have been asked to expedite raising of these battalions.
DEPLOYMENT OF SSB ALONG INDO-NEPAL BORDER
In order to ensure that there is no spillover effect of the activities of Nepalese Maoists to our territory has been given the responsibility to guard Indo-Nepal Border. The Government has also recently sanctioned new raisings for the SSB to further improve management of borders in these areas. A modernization plan involving an outlay of Rs. 444 Crores has been sanctioned for the SSB.
RECRUITMENT IN CENTRAL PARA MILITARY FORCES
In order to wean away the potential youth from the path to militancy or naxalism, recruitment guidelines have been revised to permit 40% recruitment in Central Para Military Forces from the border areas and areas affected by militancy or naxalism.
BACKWARD DISTRICT INITIATIVE
Since the naxalite menace has to be addressed on the developmental front also, the Central Government has provided financial assistance of Rs. 2,475 crores for 55 naxal affected districts in the 9 States of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Orissa, Jharkhand, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh & West Bengal under the Backward Districts Initiative (BDI) component of the Rsahtriya Sam Vikas Yojana (RSVY). Under this Scheme, an amount of Rs. 15 Crores per year has been given to each of the districts for three years so as to fill in the critical gaps in physical and social development in the naxal affected areas. The Planing Commission has been requested to include other naxal affected areas under their proposed Scheme of Backward Regions Grant Funds (BRGF) for which an outlay of Rs. 5,000 crores has been set apart from this fiscal year (2005-06) onwards.
TRIBAL AND FOREST RELATED ISSUES
In order to address the areas of disaffection among the tribals, the Government has introduced the Scheduled Tribes (Recognition of Forest Rights) Bill, 2005, in Parliament on 13-12-2005. Further, to facilitate social and physical infrastructure in the forest areas, Ministry of Environment and Forests has as requested by the MHA, issued general approval to allow such infrastructure by utilizing upto 1 hectare of forest land for non-forest purposes. That Ministry has also permitted upgradation of kutcha roads constructed prior to 01-09-1980 into pucca road.
EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF LAND REFORMS AND CREATION OF EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES IN THE NAXAL AREA.
Naxal groups have been raising mainly land and livelihood related issues. If land reforms are taken up on priority and the landless and the poor in the naxal areas are allotted surplus land, this would go a long way in tackling the developmental aspects of the naxal. The States have been requested to focus greater attention on this area as also accelerate developmental activities and create employment opportunities in the naxal affected areas with special focus on creation of physical infrastructure in terms of roads, communication, power as also social infrastructure such as school, hospitals etc.
MONITORING MECHANISMS
The Central Government accords a very high priority to review and monitor the naxal situation and the measures being taken by the states on both security and development fronts to control it. Several monitoring mechanisms have been set up at the Center to do so. These include a periodical review by the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) of the naxal situation, Standing Committee of the Chief Ministers of the naxal affected states chaired by the Union Home Minister, Quarterly Co-ordination Centre meetings chaired by the Home Secretary with the Chief Secretaries and the Directors General of Police of the affected states and the monthly Task Force meeting of Nodal Officers of Naxal affected states/Central agencies chaired by Special Secretary (IS), MHA. The states have also been asked to hold a monthly review by the GDP and the naxal situation and the measures and strategies to contain the naxal problem.
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| Rising Death Tolls Due To Naxal Violence |
CONCLUSION
The Central Government views the naxalite menace as an area of serious concern. The Government remains firmly committed and determined to address the problem. The current strategy is (i) to strengthen intelligence set-up at the state level; (ii) pursue effective and sustained intelligence driven police action against naxalites and their infrastructure individually and jointly by the states and (iii) accelerate development in the naxal affected areas. The Central Government will continue to co-ordinate and supplement the efforts to the state governments on both security and development fronts to meet the challenge posed by the naxal.
